Was the Election Rigged?

The linked article from the Washington Post uses numerical analysis -- the frequency of particular digits in the last place of the reported election results, and of last-two digit combinations -- to state with scientific certainty that the Iranian election results were fraudulent. He may be right. The analysis is persuasive, and very likely the announced vote tallies were phony.

But does that mean the election was rigged, or that it was "stolen" from Mousavi? That is a different question. One might counter with "why manufacture election results if not to change the winner?" Good question, but one might have compelling reasons to manipulate the numbers even when the desired candidate won on the real, fair numbers.

The first possibility appeals to my love of irony. One could anticipate charges of election fraud and decide to manipulate the results to inflate the margin of victory, on the theory that a wide victory margin is perceived to be less susceptible to abuse than a close one. In order to prevent critics from claiming that Ahmadinejad's 51-49% margin was provided by a few fake votes, the election authorities make it look like a landslide. This attempt has backfired, of course, if that is what they were trying to do.

Another possible reason to manipulate election results without changing the victor would be to provide a more powerful mandate for the new president. If the truth is that he was elected largely on the votes of one or two population factions but was heavily opposed by others, his ability to rule could be compromised. The country would be polarized. But if it looks like his appeal was widespread, cutting across demographic and ideological lines, a broad mandate can be crafted for him. Under this theory, the election fraud was designed to persuade undecideds and moderate opponents that the winner has broad appeal and to be supportive, and to bludgeon opponents into submission (resistance is futile).

We probably won't know until the Islamic Republic falls and its archives are opened what really happened in the Election of 2009, and if the results were manipulated, why. The relative popularity of the different candidates is a matter of debate. The consensus seems to be that Ahmadinejad is the favorite of the poor and working classes, religious conservatives, and the conservative rural communities, while Mousavi was favored by the upper classes and the educated urban populations. It's a bit of a throwback to late 60's America, with Nixon's "Silent Majority" and the noisy youth.

If this picture is correct, then I am inclined to believe that Ahmadinejad (I'madinnerjacket is a hilarious nickname) did, in fact, win the election. The populations presumed to prefer Ahmadinejad tend to be much larger than the elements given to Mousavi. They draw far less attention to themselves, however, because they are not out in the streets, and they typically do not express themselves eloquently. Church-going farmers aren't often appearing on TV or writing op-ed pieces and blogs.

My take on the election is not unique. I read an analysis piece in the Post a week ago from a "policy expert" opining that Ahmadinejad probably did win. His explanation was persuasive. It fit with my educated intuitions about the political makeup of most populations. This analysis is probably behind the Obama Administration's cautious response to the election controversy. It would not be wise for the U.S. Government to proclaim its moral outrage over a stolen election that frustrates the will of the people when the announced election results really did reflect the will of a majority of the people -- even if fraudulent.

Iran will be interesting to watch. There clearly is a high level of discontent with the established order in the country. I doubt the majority of protestors care so much about Mousavi himself. He was merely the candidate around whom the dissatisfied could coalesce. The crisis is more about the Iranian political order than the election of 2009. So far, the ruling elite is responding in a classic fashion, a fashion that more often than not promotes a more committed, disciplined, widespread opposition over the long-term. When repressive regimes respond to popular discontent with repression -- how else can they respond? -- that response tends to be successful when the discontent is from a discrete minority group or about a transient issue, but extremely unsuccessful when the discontent is from a substantial portion of the dominant group and over fundamental political issues. That bodes ill for the Ayatollahs.